Author: Marcos Ferrer

Well, loyal readers, John Dean didn’t set me off with his recent column (insufficiently fascist, entirely too rational), AND I want to think about what he said before deciding to respond.  This means we can take our discussion about BA and Identity Systems back to the highest level, before we diving for the next drill down (I know, I promised a drill down, AND this is more fun). 

In this case, the highest level issue that comes to mind regarding Identity Systems has to do with “executive sponsorship” for a national consensus on the requirements for such systems.

The ONLY source of executive sponsorship powerful enough for BAs to succeed in Identitying System Requirements are the people themselves, and yet the people (as a whole) rarely rally to a transparent process for the common good, which is exactly what we are proposing.  When the people do rally, the effect is immense.

Let’s face it – half the time, a BA can’t even get quality requirements on projects where the stakes are much smaller than for a National Identity System.  Commonly accepted “project failure” symptoms, such as Failure of user acceptance, Failure to deliver mission critical function, Missed deadlines, Over budget, Poor requirements documentation, Scope creep, etc. sound like Project Management problems to outsiders and executives. 

Most BAs know that these failures are really due to organizational resistance (including stakeholders and IT people) to the BA process.  As the famous joke goes:

Q:  How hard is it to deliver on time and under budget?

A:  It’s easy, how much must I spend by when?

Time and money are very important, but not if the what you are building gets lost in opaque, non-transparent petty politics.  The root problems tend to be deeply human ones, revolving around self respect, conflict avoidance, territoriality, work avoidance, organizational tribalism (silos and secrecy), fear of change, lack of trust and much more. 

To these deeply human issues, let us not forget simple corruption, which is less emotional and more premeditated, and cringes in the light that BA practice can bring.

This suggests the Five Great Challenges to our profession.  These are the issues that will define our profession, and will decide if BA can make a difference.  We believe that we can increase project success and reduce the overwhelming waste and failure rate that is currently an accepted part of the world of projects.  Will everyone else?

Will the society at large empower BAs to operate at the level of professionalism required of (say) accountants (transparency, completeness, accuracy)?

1. Given the importance of the what in a project, will PMI agree that BA must precede projects, and BAs must be at least peers with PMPs, instead of answering to their time and budget needs first?
2. Will the earliest CBAPs actually be a credit to the profession?  Will they generate successes, and word of mouth, to help boost the profession, or will they have the same outcomes as everyone else?
3.  Can the society at large understand the BA process well enough to understand why they want to support it?
4. What, if any, are the rules for public disclosure of private malfeasance?  There are such standards for lawyers, doctors, accountants, etc.  What will ours be?
5. What, if any, are the rules for public disclosure of private malfeasance?  There are such standards for lawyers, doctors, accountants, etc.  What will ours be?

Mere certification cannot resolve these issues, but it is a good start.  If you believe, like I do, that BA must rise in our society, please contact me with your ideas. We must lead, or continue to follow, and I for one am tired of being an armchair quarterback.

Thanks for being my reader, if this inspired you at all, please make a comment, so BA Times can know that we care.

Have fun!

Congratulations to John Dean for his analysis of what to do with a nearly infinite list of specific identity transactions (see March 2nd blog for the list, and John’s April blog for his ideas). 

Improve on it if you can, but I like his idea of grouping identity transactions by the “certainty” required, and using known technologies (Human Chip Insertion, Fingerprints, DNA, Retina prints, id cards) to “produce” the needed certainty.  Each “identifier” stakeholder can simply select the level of certainty they require from such a system.  This is a huge simplification, and seems to be a doable analysis.  There is evidence for the accuracy of many tests, AND we will have to consider the usual 4-D time/space complications (DNA is reliable, and is easy to plant at a crime scene).

Condemnation upon John for his focus on the “identifier” stakeholder, instead of “we the identified”, who live on the other side of such transactions (mostly). 

Leaving out the identified in these analyses is (increasingly) the cause of problems like identity theft, loss of privacy, deprivation of due process (sure, you can fix your erroneous credit record – have fun with your new full-time hobby), erosion of civil rights, and much, much more (the teen suicide who was berated on-line by the adult mother of another teen?).

Leaving us out of the requirements gives John access to a seemingly EASY solution – “chip insertion”.  The risk of crooks “stealing” someone else’s chip for illegal purposes can be dealt with by rigging the chips to self-destruct if removed or fiddled with.  I leave the problem of “counterfeit” chips for a later discussion (solution, as usual, is premature,so nyah, nyah, nyah, Mr. Dean).

This kind of solution is especially tempting for management, in spite of being clearly odious to the “workers. 

The day is coming where, if you are a convicted drug user, or a crummy boyfriend, or a whistleblower, or just a cranky person, people will be able to single you out electronically – even treat you the way we treat convicted pedophiles, just by accessing your history based on your chip id. 

Convicted pedophiles and other sexual criminals already know what this is like – no chance to really start over, always labeled.  The process created by the “identifiers” is great for labeling one for life; not so great for allowing for change and forgiveness. 

The current system protects the interests of the “identifier” stakeholders (John, language is important – can we just call them fascists?).  It assumes recidivism, and does not measure rehabilitation.  Remember – Civil Liberties are not just for people that you like.

One can claim that measuring rehabilitation is a different problem from identification.  Unlike John Dean, my perceptive readers immediately realize that if we can’t measure rehabilitation, then crime, or any “unapproved behavior” becomes a life sentence in the system John advocates.  Do you really want the letter L tattooed on your forehead for life, just because you once littered?

We’ll deal with such “identifier” requirements next time.  In the meantime, as a proof of concept for John’s analysis approach, would you agree with the following estimates of how much certainty is currently required for the following identity transactions?.

Amount of certitude required to identify:

1. A terrorist = 0.1% (if we harass 1,000 people to actually catch one terrorist, we are satisfied – witness Guantanamo).
2. Oneself for a driver’s license = 10% (or commerce will shut down – i.e., it is easy to fake the id required)
3. Oneself to buy coffee and donuts = 95.0% (5% of transactions are “fraudulent”?)
4. A death penalty convict = 70% (30% of death row inmates may not belong there, the states’ “management” are not investigating their own mistakes, of course). 
5. A safe sex partner (varies by individual from 99.5% for those who want to witness your HIV test in person, no cheating, to 0% for Larry Craig, Senator from Idaho, who would prefer to know nothing about anyone next to him in a bathroom stall).

I finish with an important success point – small teams.  I want to make the point that our two person “team” (John Dean and myself) is (so far) enormously productive.

In perhaps 20 total person hours of actual focused, asynchronous but responsive work, we have enough grip on the scope to already despair of the sheer scope of the problem – this is good progress!

Next month (unless John tees me off again) we will contrast John’s “certainty” requirements with the requirements that “we the identified” might want to add.

Stay tuned – if we get the requirements right, it may only take one generation to finish this, and none to soon!